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Abstract We examine the chief executive officer (CEO) optimism effect on managerial 
motives for cash holdings and find that optimistic and non-optimistic managers have 
significantly dissimilar purposes for holding more cash. This is consistent with both theory and 
evidence that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds. Optimistic managers hoard 
cash for growth opportunities, use relatively more cash for capital expenditure and acquisitions, 
and save more cash in adverse conditions. By contrast, they hold fewer inventories and 
receivables and their precautionary demand for cash holdings is less than that of non-optimistic 
managers. In addition, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that 
optimistic managers’ cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively. We 
also document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic 
managers do. Our work highlights the crucial role that CEO characteristics play in shaping 
corporate cash holding policy. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of cash reserves in corporate financing and investment decisions is changing. Keynes (1936) emphasizes 
that a demand for corporate cash savings occurs only when a firm is financially constrained.  Conversely, if a firm is 
financially unconstrained, it does not need cash savings for future investments, because it can access capital markets 
freely.  How much cash a firm should hold in reserve has been paid more attention in recent years as the role and 
interests of managers have been increasingly taken into account.  Jensen (1986) argues that the quantity of cash that 
will be held is influenced by the self-interest of managers, who may not always use cash reserves for activities that 
maximize shareholder wealth. Recent studies have linked liquidity management to management entrenchment, for 
example, studies on corporate governance linked to the value of cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Lee and Lee 
2009; and Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2014) and the level of cash reserves (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008), and the 
effect of chief executive officers’ (CEO) professional experience on corporate debt and cash policies (Dittmar and 
Duchi 2014).   
While prior studies show that the use and value of cash holdings vary by corporate financial constraint status, 
corporate governance conditions, shareholder protection regulations, and across countries,1 less attention has been 
paid to examining whether biased managerial beliefs affect the motives for corporate cash holdings.  To fill the gap 
in this literature, this paper investigates whether CEO optimism has an influence on a manager’s motivations for 
cash accumulation.  Specifically, we examine each cash holding motive including debt capacity, hedge needs for 
investment, growth opportunity, acquisitions and precautionary savings and compare them between firms governed 
by optimistic and non-optimistic managers.    
Within the field of behavioral corporate finance, optimism has been most closely identified with situations of 
managers under-estimating the risk attached to certain decisions (Heaton 2002; Englmaier 2010). This definition has 
                                                            
1  Other studies relate cash policy to different issues. For example, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) 
examine the propensity to save cash out of cash flow for financially constrained firms. Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
examine the marginal value of an extra dollar to shareholders to show that the value of cash differs across firms.  
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) examine the value of cash across countries and find that the value of cash 
matters less than in countries with better investor protection. Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) document that 
the demand for liquidity (higher cash) by financially constrained firms is highly dependent on the level of hedging 
needs. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) study that the shareholders of poorly and well-governed firms have 
dramatically different values of cash.  Riddick and Whited (2009) study that firms save more out of cash flows when 
external financing is costly or when they have lumpy investment projects. Hill, Fuller, Kelly and Washam (2014) 
show that firms with stronger political connections hold lower cash balances. Other studies investigate corporate 
cash holdings for specific targets, including those of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) for the U.K., Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2001) for Japan, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) for European countries, and Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) 
for Switzerland.   
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also been used in the context of managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a), although the term 
overconfidence is more generally associated with situations where managers are over-estimating the returns or 
rewards associated with certain decisions (Hackbarth 2008; Malmendier et al. 2008). However, the managerial 
characteristic of over-estimating rewards has also been labelled as optimism (Heaton 2002; Englmaier 2010). 
Although our approach is most closely related to those studies that use the term optimism (e.g. Puri and Robinson 
2007; Campbell, Galleyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley 2011), these studies and this paper do not preclude the 
possibility of a role for managerial overconfidence. The difficulty in distinguishing between optimism and 
overconfidence is further compounded by the literature itself using similar options holdings data in empirical 
applications.2  In this paper, we use the term optimism to maintain consistency with Campbell et al. (2011), as our 
methodology most closely follows this earlier study.  Readers, however, will still see the term overconfidence 
mentioned in this paper when we refer to corresponding prior studies. 
There is a growing literature that indicates managers make biased decisions on financial and investment 
policies when their judgment is distorted by optimism. We summarize optimistic managers’ major characteristics, 
that are distinct from non-optimistic managers, here: First, biased managers prefer internal funds to external funds 
for investment projects and are more likely than other managers to raise debt than equity (Heaton 2002; Malmendier 
and Tate 2005a).3 Second, firms managed by overconfident managers pay less dividends (Cordeiro 2009; Deshmukh 
et al. 2010). That is, overconfident managers overestimate firms’ future performance and prefer retaining cash flows 
for potential investment opportunities. In turn, they are reluctant to pay dividends to shareholders. Third, optimistic 
and overconfident managers overinvest if they overvalue firm future earnings (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b; 
Puri and Robinson 2007) and underinvest (and reject positive net present value (NPV) projects) if they have to seek 
external funds (Heaton 2002). Fourth, Liu and Taffler (2008) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers and acquisitions than non-optimistic CEOs.  
                                                            
2 For instance, Campbell et al. (2011) use ExecuComp’s exercisable options data as the proxy for CEO optimism, 
which in their setting is closely related to the CEO overconfidence measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), who 
use a dataset combining stock ownership and a set of option packages provided by Brian Hall and David Yermack 
from Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995). 
3 In general, external financing is more expensive than internal financing for firms, particularly for financially 
constrained firms. Biased managers are much more reluctant to use outside financing than rational managers, since 
they believe firm value is underestimated in the financial markets and the cost of external financing is thus 
overpriced. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) find that corporate investment decisions made by overconfident chief 
executive officers (CEOs) are substantially related to internal funds.  Heaton (2002) builds a model to show that 
optimistic managers will decline positive NPV projects if they have to fund externally for these projects.  Hackbarth 
(2008) shows theoretically that biased managers have higher debt levels than unbiased managers.  
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Although prior studies have examined the impact of CEO optimism and overconfidence on corporate decisions, 
relatively few prior investigations try to determine differences between optimistic and non-optimistic managers in 
controlling and operating firm liquid assets (motives for cash holdings).  To the best of our knowledge, the most 
relevant papers, though indirectly related, to a connection between CEO overconfidence and cash holdings are those 
of Malmendier and Tate (2008), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) and Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2013).  
Malmendier and Tate (2008) shows that overconfident CEOs prefer cash and debt financing for their acquisitions 
and overpay for them. Malmendier et al. (2011) finds that non-optimistic CEOs are less likely than overconfident 
CEOs to use cash financing.  Ferris et al. (2013) provides strong evidence that overconfident CEOs use more cash to 
finance their acquisitions than non-overconfident CEOs, particularly for firms headquartered in common law 
countries.  If optimistic managers’ financing strategies are self-limited and distinct from those of non-optimistic 
managers, the issue of what motives optimistic managers may have for holding and spending their cash is well 
disposed for investigation.  There is currently no study addressing this issue. Therefore, our study adds to this 
literature by seeking to understand how optimistic managers deal with their cash balances, and by doing so to shed 
more light on both CEO optimism and cash policy. 
To test our key hypothesis that optimistic and non-optimistic managers have dissimilar motivations for holding 
cash, our first step is to collect CEO data from ExecuComp database and firm-level data from CRSP/Compustat 
database between 1992 and 2010.  Following Campbell et al. (2011), we use their option-based CEO optimism 
measure to identify a CEO to be optimistic or non-optimistic if s/he holds options very deep in the money.  A CEO 
who holds options more than 100% in-the-money is considered to be relatively optimistic.  A detailed explanation of 
the CEO optimism measure is introduced in Section 3.4  We also consider a less stringent 67% cutoff, which allows 
us to examine the extent of the CEO optimism effect on the motives for holding cash.  This options based measure is 
widely used in models designed to understand managerial decision making in firms, and there is therefore value in 
maintaining consistency with these parallel literatures. For example, studies have observed that executives will 
                                                            
4 The managers may become risk averse and hoard cash if they have a high ownership share.  In that case, this 
measure may be less related to their level of optimism.  However, our later findings show that the interaction term of 
managerial ownership percentage and CEO optimism is negative and significant, which means, ceteris paribus, that 
optimistic managers hold less cash than non-optimistic managers as their share ownership increases. This would 
seem to suggest that holding deep-in-the-money options is not reflecting the same managerial characteristics as 
holding many shares.  Another possible weakness of the measure is that new CEOs might have different incentives 
to pursue higher cash balances if their options are way out of the money.  However, the option-based optimism 
measure that we apply in our study considers the exercising status beyond the vesting period.  This means that new 
CEOs are likely to be excluded.  We also consider an alternative measure of optimism, based on firm investment 
levels, which we describe below. Our findings from either measure are consistent. 
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exercise their options, when there are restrictions and regulations on short-selling their shares (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005). Such exercise activity, or indeed the continued holding of in-the-money options, will reflect the manager’s 
perspective on their firm. This could reasonably be assumed to reflect a level of optimism. Since managers normally 
own a large amount of options, which puts them in a situation of high exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of their 
firms, holding on to deep in-the-money options reflects a high level of optimism.5  Influential studies that have used 
this measurement approach include Billett and Qian (2008), Liu and Taffler (2008), Campbell et al. (2011), and 
Hirshleifer et al (2012).   
In addition, we examine an alternative CEO optimism measure, firm investment levels, as a further robustness 
test. As emphasized by Campbell et al. (2011), this should avoid the direct connection between managerial 
incentives and managerial compensations. We use this as a reflection of how positive a manager feels towards the 
firm’s investment activity and its future performance.  The regression models for examining motives for cash 
holdings that we use in this paper draw upon the models proposed by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) 
and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), who find that average firms would hold more cash if their growth opportunities 
are strong.  
Our results can be summarized as follows.6  First, we confirm that both optimistic and non-optimistic managers 
accumulate cash over the sample period. However, optimistic managers tend to hold more cash than non-optimistic 
managers. The mean cash ratio of optimistic managers is 0.145, higher than the value of 0.120 for non-optimistic 
managers. This is consistent with theories that optimistic managers pay less dividends and prefer to utilize internal 
funds. Second, optimistic managers tend to reserve more cash for larger deals. We find a positive and significant 
relation between cash holdings and research and development (R&D) spending for firms managed by optimistic 
managers.  Third, optimistic managers have relatively more volatile cash balances.  Our results indicate that the cash 
balances of optimistic managers vary more than those of non-optimistic managers and do so in response to changes 
in R&D spending.  Absolute cash changed by $3.11 per $1.00 of R&D for optimistic firms, which is more than 
double that in the case of non-optimistic firms (where absolute cash changed by $1.50 per $1.00 increase in R&D). 
                                                            
5 In the study of the tradeoff between undiversified executives and their exercisable options by Hall and Murphy 
(2002), the authors find that risk-averse and undiversified executives (defined as those that hold more than 67% of 
their wealth in company stock) hold in-the-money options less longer than relatively less risk-averse and less 
undiversified executives.  That is, greater risk aversion and under-diversification lead the manager to exercise 
options early or immediately after the vesting period.  From this we could reasonably infer that a manager who is 
risk-averse and undiversified can be considered to be optimistic if they persist in holding deep in-the-money options, 
since this would not be expected if they are risk averse and hold too many shares. 
6 All models include year and industry fixed effects and the results are robust to clustering standard errors by firm 
for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation.   
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By contrast, cash balances for optimistic firms do not respond to acquisitions or capital investment differently to 
those of non-optimistic firms. Fourth, capital expenditures and acquisition expenditures are negatively correlated 
with cash holdings, meaning that firms with optimistic managers take on more cash-financed capital investment and 
acquisitions.  Fifth, CEO optimism leads firms to hold fewer inventories and receivables.  Unlike IPO firms with 
sufficient money, non-IPO optimistic firms that plan to reserve more cash have to reduce their net working capital.  
We also report that optimistic managers save less than non-optimistic managers for precautionary purposes. This 
relates to the theory that optimistic managers underestimate risk. Their cash saving motives are mainly for growth 
opportunities, not for future uncertainty.  Finally, we find that optimistic managers are more sensitive to market 
conditions and save more cash than non-optimistic managers when times are bad. Our results are robust to a variety 
of model specifications and alternative CEO optimism measures (firm investment).  
The next section discusses the research design. Section 3 describes the data, including sample selection and the 
main measures of optimistic managers, and presents some summary statistics. Section 4 presents the main empirical 
analysis, including robustness tests, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Research design  
Our work is motivated by the study of Heaton (2002) who emphasizes that optimistic CEOs systematically 
overestimate firm performance and tend to overinvest in negative NPV projects and underinvest in positive NPV 
projects if they have to seek external funds as a consequence. Similarly, we consider optimistic CEOs as managers 
who expect future outcomes to be better than they really are. The objective of our study is to see whether this 
overinvestment–underinvestment trade-off triggers optimistic managers to vary their cash balances over time, so that 
cash holdings may appear to be at different levels to those of non-optimistic firms and possibly more volatile. 
Consistent with the prior studies that have shown that optimistic managers have different characteristics that 
influence their decision making, we also seek to determine whether the motivations for hoarding cash and the use of 
cash holdings are different in firms governed by optimistic managers.   
Our modeling approach uses the cross section regression developed by Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. 
(2009), which they used to identify the determinants of cash holdings by firms. The model regresses the cash-to-
asset ratio onto determinants reflecting investment opportunities (including the market-to-book ratio and capital 
expenditures), size, leverage, growth opportunities, dividends, large investments (acquisition activities), and 
precautionary savings motives. Also, following Opler et al, (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), we add two new 
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control variables – managerial ownership percentage and the square of managerial ownership percentage to capture 
the concave relationship between cash holdings and managerial ownership, which these and other studies have 
identified.7 
We recast the above cash holdings model by adding interaction terms involving CEO optimism. Therefore, our 
model not only examines the determinants of cash holdings for average firms but also effectively shows the 
incremental impact of CEO optimism on cash holdings associated with firm characteristics. The cash model for each 
firm i at year t is  
ܥܽݏ݄௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଷܥܽݏ݄݂݈݋ݓ௜,௧ ൅ ߙସܹܰܥ௜,௧ ൅ ߙହܥܽ݌݁ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܮ݈ܽ݃݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
ߙ଻ܴ&ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܦ݅ݒ݀ݑ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܣܿݍ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴	ܫ݊݀ݑݏ݅ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܱݓ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶܱݓ݊2௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵଷܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵସܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܳ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵହܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଺ܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܥܽݏ݄݂݈݋ݓ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଻ܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܹܰܥ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଵ଼ܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܥܽ݌݁ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଽܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܮ݈ܽ݃݁ݒ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶ଴ܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܴ&ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶଵܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܦ݅ݒ݀ݑ௜,௧ ൅
ߙଶଶܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܿݍ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶଷܦ௜,௧ ∗ 	 ܫ݊݀ݑݏ݅݃௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶସܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܱݓ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶହܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܱݓ݊2௜,௧	 ൅ ߝ௜,௧  (1) 
where the dependent variable is the proxy for cash holdings and the explanatory variables include a set of firm 
characteristics and these variables interacted with the CEO optimism dummy variable. 
Firms have several motives to save more cash, such as investment opportunities, financial distress costs, 
growth opportunities, and industry cash flow risk. The main proxies for investment opportunities are the market-to-
book ratio (Q) and capital expenditures (Capex).  The variable R&D represents the role of growth opportunities. 
When firms expand their technology development and performance, they may increase their cash levels to support 
this.  Firms may issue debt for investment opportunities, which mean that they would not need to use cash to fund 
all projects.  For optimistic managers, internal funding is prioritized; they therefore consider the allocation of cash 
and debt funds on these projects particularly important. The variable Indusig, or industry sigma, measures cash flow 
risk, which is the proxy for the precautionary saving motive. The greater cash flow risk, the more cash is reserved.8 
The variable Size captures the economies of scales in cash and we expect a negative relation between cash 
holdings and firm size. The cash flow-to-assets ratio (Cashflow) can be either negatively or positively related to cash 
holdings (e.g., Kim, Mauer, and Sherman 1998; Almeida et al. 2004). Firms with greater earnings or those presumed 
                                                            
7 Managerial ownership has been found to influence cash holdings in many countries, see, for example, Luo and 
Hachiya (2005) for Japan and Yu, Sopranzetti, and Lee (2015) for Taiwan. 
8 Han and Qiu (2007) and Riddick and Whited (2009) show that cash flow shocks do matter for corporate propensity 
for savings. There is a positive relation between a firm's income uncertainty and cash savings. 
   
8 
to be less risky and thus having more investment opportunities are expected to have a lower demand for cash. By 
contrast, financially constrained firms are expected to save more cash out of cash flow. Net working capital (NWC) 
can be regarded as a substitute for cash, leading to an expected negative relation between net working capital and 
cash holdings.9  Leverage can have two potentially opposing effects on cash balances. Firms may use cash to pay 
debt if they are intent on reducing their leverage level while their financial status is constrained. Alternatively, if 
firms have greater hedging needs, they may prefer to hold more cash than to lower their debt capacity (Acharya et al. 
2007).  In our study, we use the one-year lagged value of leverage (Laglev) to avoid a possible endogeneity issue 
caused by a correlation between cash and leverage through contemporaneous interest expenses.  Acquisition 
activities (Acq) are large investments that represent cash outflows and have a negative relation with cash.  The more 
acquisition expenditures, the more cash outflows and the less cash holdings.  Companies save less cash when it 
comes to any increase in acquisition expenditures.  The variables, percentage of managerial ownership (Own) and 
the square of the percentage of managerial ownership (Own2), are included to capture the concave relationship 
between managerial ownership and cash holdings.  In general, it is shareholders’ interest for managers not to hold 
idle cash. Due to managerial risk aversion, however, managers will tend to hold more cash when their ownership 
percentage increases.  When it becomes too costly to hold more cash and their cash holdings are above an optimal 
level, managers may seek to reduce cash holdings, giving rise to a concave relationship with ownership.  The data 
used to measure each of the explanatory variables is described in Section 3 below and in more detail in Appendix 1.    
To capture the effects of managerial optimism, we add to the base-line determinants of cash holdings a dummy 
variable (D) that indicates whether the manager of the firm is optimistic or not. The proxy for CEO optimism is 
determined by the average percent moneyness of the options held by a CEO.  The details of the optimism measure 
are given in Section 3 below. In addition, we include interaction terms of the optimism dummy variable with each of 
the potential determinants of cash flow holdings. This design helps to explicitly explain whether optimistic 
managers have distinct cash-financing plans and how differently they hoard cash.     
We also examine a number of augmented specifications of the cash model as robustness checks. First, we 
examine whether there is a tendency for firms to reduce their net working capital (which contains noncash 
components of liquid assets) to hoard cash. To do so, firms that have gone public in the past five years are excluded 
from the model because initial public offering (IPO) firms hold large amounts of cash from issuing equity.  
                                                            
9 The net working capital ratio in this paper is net of cash.  Thus, a negative relation between the cash ratio and the 
net working capital ratio is expected in the regression analysis. 
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Excluding IPO firms enables us to distinguish the sources of cash hoarding.  Next, we incorporate the sum of net 
debt and equity issuance to assets as an additional variable in the cash holdings model to make sure our findings are 
not related to net issuances.  In further analysis, we control for any influence of debt conservatism and market 
conditions.  As a final robustness check, we follow Campbell et al. (2011) and use firm investment data to measure 
optimism.  This is because the results of Malmendier and Tate (2005), Campbell et al. (2011) and Gervais, Heaton, 
and Odean (2011) show that managerial optimism appears to have influence on firm investment. 
3 Data description and summary statistics 
3.1 Data selection and CEO optimism measures 
We first consider all CEO–firm data in the ExecuComp database between 1992 and 2010.  Firms are included in the 
final sample if they meet the following screening criteria: (1) the firm is not a utility firm (Standard Industrial 
Classification, hereafter SIC, codes between 4900 and 4999) or a financial service firm (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6999)10; (2) each firm included in the sample has valid compensation and firm-level data for at least two years.  
These criteria result in 1,001 observations in the optimism sample and 4,902 observations in the non-optimistic 
sample. Table 1 summarizes the data selection process and outcome. 
[Table 1] 
Following Campbell et al. (2011) our measures of CEO optimism are based on vested option holdings.11 
Optimistic managers are defined as holding exercisable options with over 100% moneyness, while non-optimistic 
managers are defined as holding options that have less than 100% moneyness.12  To calculate the average percentage 
of the options’ moneyness, we use two variables: the realizable value per option (RV) and the estimated average 
                                                            
10 Utility companies’ cash holdings may relate to regulatory supervision across many states. Financial companies 
have a number of main businesses involving inventories of marketable securities that are part of cash.   
11 The CEO optimism measure of Campbell et al. (2011) is also used by Malmendier et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et 
al. (2012). Malmendier et al. (2011) use this measure alongside their own options-based measure and find consistent 
results after controlling for debt conservatism and market conditions. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) use this measure to 
study the relation between CEO optimism and investment in innovation.  
12 These definitions are inspired by the work of Campbell et al. (2011), who create measures of CEO optimism 
based on stock option holding. They classify high-optimistic managers as those who hold exercisable options that 
are more than 100% in the money, in a given year. To be classified as high-optimistic in a given year, managers 
must have held options that are more than 100% in the money for at least two of the years in the sample. In this 
paper, we focus on optimistic managers; thus we use the high-optimistic measure to define an optimistic manager. 
Their paper defines rational–optimistic managers who hold and/or exercise options with moneyness between 30% 
and 100%.  In addition, they define low-optimistic managers as those who exercise options that are less than 30% in 
the money and do not hold options greater than 30% in the money. We group these latter two cases and define 
moneyness less than 100% non-optimistic.  
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exercise price of the option (AEP). The variable RV is defined as the total realizable value of the exercisable options 
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) divided by the total number of exercisable options 
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM).13  The variable AEP is the value of the stock’s closing price at the fiscal year-end 
(Compustat item #199) minus RV.  We can obtain the average percentage of option moneyness from the calculation 
of RV/AEP. 
Although the optimism benchmark is designed to separate managers who are comparatively positive about the 
future from those that are not so positive, it is possible that firms holding options with moneyness near the 100% 
boundary may be less well identified as optimistic or non-optimsitic. The approach to dealing with this in prior 
studies has been to consider an alternative boundary point, and we adopt that approach here also. We follow the 
alternative definition of Campbell et al. (2011) that optimistic managers are those having stock options with a 
moneyness in excess of 67%, which is itself inspired by the overconfidence measure of Malmendier and Tate 
(2005a). Our sample with the 67% cutoff generated 1,908 optimistic observations and 6,790 non-optimistic 
observations. Campbell et al. (2011) conduct two validation analyses of their classification of optimistic managers to 
show that their method contains findings consistent with those of Malmendier and Tate (2005a). Their examination 
also confirms the similarity of the classification of optimistic CEOs to that used by Malmendier and Tate (2005a). 
We collect firm-level data on a variety of firm characteristics from the Centre for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP)/Compustat database.  These include the data for the explanatory variables proposed in equation (1) of 
Section 2.  A detailed description of each of the variables is contained in the Appendix 1.  Missing R&D 
observations are set to zero.14   Net working capital is separated from cash and short-term investments.  All 
accounting data are adjusted by the consumer price index in 2010.  In accordance with Bates et al. (2009), the 
variables are winsorized as follows.  The top tail of Q is winsorized at the 1% level. The bottom tails of the cash 
flow-to-assets ratio and the net working capital-to-assets ratio are winsorized at the 1% level. The capital 
expenditure-to-assets ratio, the R&D-to-sales ratio, the acquisitions-to-assets ratio, and the industry cash flow risk 
are winsorized at the 1% level.  The one-year lagged value of the leverage-to-assets ratio is winsorized to lie 
between 0 and 1.  
                                                            
13 The ExecuComp item identifiers are provided in parentheses. 
14 It is common for corporate finance studies to set missing R&D values to zero (e.g., Opler et al. 1999; Faulkender 
and Wang 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Bates et al. 2009). 
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3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables for optimistic managers and non-
optimistic managers based on two panels using the 100% and 67% CEO optimism cutoffs, respectively.   
[Table 2] 
The cash ratio is right-skewed for both groups, which is in line with the literature (e.g., Kim et al. 1998; 
Almeida et al. 2004; Ferreira and Vilela 2004; Bates et al. 2009). The mean and median values for the cash ratio of 
optimistic managers (for the 100% cut-off) are 14.5% and 8.7%, respectively, statistically higher (p < 0.01) than 
those of non-optimistic managers (12.0% and 6.0%, respectively), consistent with our expectations. This also 
strongly supports prior studies of the effects of CEO optimism, which find that optimistic and overconfident CEOs 
demand internal funds, prefer to pay less dividends, overinvest in projects, and invest in more acquisitions than non-
optimistic managers. 
Optimistic managers seem to undertake bigger investment than non-optimistic managers, since all their mean 
and median values for Q, capital expenditures, R&D, and acquisitions are higher than for non-optimistic managers. 
The mean Q for optimistic managers is 3.216, which is higher (p < 0.01) than the mean of non-optimistic managers 
(1.943), suggesting that optimistic managers have better future investment opportunities than non-optimistic 
managers.15  The upper quartile of optimistic managers has two times more R&D expenditures and acquisition 
outflows than the corresponding quartile of non-optimistic managers. These figures indicate that optimistic 
managers have larger investments than non-optimistic managers.  
The mean and median leverage of firms with optimistic managers are 18.3% and 16.5%, respectively, lower 
than the figures of 22.7% and 21.6%, respectively, of firms with non-optimistic managers (p < 0.01). This 
information implies that, on average, firms with optimistic managers have less debt issuance than non-optimistically 
managed firms, which is consistent with the evidence of Malmendier et al. (2011), where firms with overconfident 
managers are debt conservative and issue debt to levels lower than the point of maximum tax benefits.   
                                                            
15  One might be tempted to argue that high-Q optimistic firms should have lower cash holdings than low-Q 
optimistic firms as they can use more cash flows to finance future growth options.  To examine this issue, we 
separate high-Q firms from low-Q firms within each group (optimistic and rational).  The classification of Q ratios 
into high and low is based on its mean value. Appendix 2 shows the result that the mean cash holdings of the 
optimistic group with high Q ratios is higher than for the optimistic group with low Q ratios (p<0.01). A similar 
result is found when we partition the sample by R&D, instead of Q.     
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We also notice that the percentage of dividend-paying firms in the optimistic group is 49%.  This is 
significantly less than the corresponding figure of 59.5% in the non-optimistic group. These statistics are consistent 
with the theory that most firms governed by optimistic managers are less likely to pay dividends. When the 
optimism criterion is loosened, which means that the cutoff is changed from 100% to 67% moneyness, the number 
of dividend payers in the optimistic group increases to 54.3%, which is significantly different from 59% of the non-
optimistic group at the 1% significance level.  Also, the difference in the managerial ownership percentage between 
optimistic and non-optimistic groups is statistically insignificant. However, the square term of managerial ownership 
in the optimistic group is slightly lower than that of the non-optimistic group. 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrices of the set of exogenous variables with each other and the cash 
holdings for the optimistic and non-optimistic groups based on both the 100% and 67% CEO optimism cutoffs 
(Panels A and B, respectively).  Cash holdings are positively related to the market-to-book ratio, R&D spending, 
and industry cash flow risk (p < 0.01) in both the optimistic and non-optimistic groups.  In particular, cash has a 
closer relation with R&D in the optimistic group than in the non-optimistic group.  We also find that cash in firms 
with optimistic managers has weaker connections with their lagged leverage levels and acquisition expenditures 
compared to that in firms with non-optimistic managers.  The debt conservatism measure, Kink, is positively related 
to cash holdings, and the relationship is stronger in the optimistic group than in the non-optimistic group. It is also 
worth noting that the correlations between cash holdings and managerial ownership variables (Own and Own2) are 
positive and significant in the non-optimistic group and not significantly different from zero in the optimistic group.  
[Table 3] 
Table 4 reports the number of firm–year observations and the average cash ratio in each year for the two 
groups, separated and aggregated, from 1993 to 2009. 16   The average percentage of optimistic firm–year 
observations in the full sample is 16.85%.  We notice that the number of such observations has fallen since 2007 and 
dropped to only 6.94% in 2009.  These statistics imply that fewer managers are optimistic during U.S. recession 
periods.  In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. economy experienced a serious housing bubble, a job cut crisis, and decreases 
in consumption, personal income, and real gross domestic product.  There are relatively more optimistic managers 
                                                            
16 After matching the sample with ownership data and estimating the one-year lagged leverage, the effective period 
for our analysis is between 1993 and 2009. 
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during bull periods, for example, from July 1994 to September 2000 and from March 2003 to December 2006.17  
Moreover, the variability of cash balances in the optimistic group is greater than that in the non-optimistic group 
over the sample period (p < 0.01). Figure 1 virtually shows the difference using the average R&D-to-sales ratio of 
optimistic and non-optimistic groups from 1993 to 2009. Firms with optimistic CEOs have much greater (less) R&D 
expenditures than non-optimistically managed firms from 1993 to 2005 (2006 to 2009), in line with the period of 
their big cash hoards. 
 [Table 4] 
 [Figure 1] 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 What factors dominate the tendency of corporations to hoard cash? 
The summary statistics show that the cash holdings of our full sample and two sub-sample groups (optimistic and 
non-optimistic) have increased in recent years.  We begin by examining whether the increase in cash holdings can 
be explained by firm characteristics, without the inclusion of the CEO optimism effect. Since the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model may be inappropriate if the distribution of the dependent variable (Cash in our case) is highly 
positively skewed in the (0, 1) range, we also employ the beta distribution (Beta) model which is well suited for use 
in proportional data analysis, as a robustness tool.18 In Table 5, Panel A, we provide summary statistics of the 
distribution of cash holdings for the full sample to that clearly shows the high positive skewness of Cash. Figure 2 
also shows the skewness in the ratio whereby the majority of our sample has the cash ratio ranging  between 0% and 
20%. These findings support our use of the Beta distribution model.  
In Panel B of Table 5, we show both OLS and Beta regression results. All models in our study include year 
and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering.  The sign and significance of all 
variables are consistent with our predictions (in the Appendix 1) and those documented by Opler et al (1999) and 
Bates et al. (2009).   
                                                            
17 The starting and ending points of the bull and bear markets are based on the data of Cunado, Gil-Alana, and Perez 
de Gracia (2008).  
18 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of the beta distribution. Examples of the development and 
application of the beta distribution in regression models include Kieschnick and McCullough (2003), Wagner (2001), 
and Berggren, Daunfeldt, and Hellström (2014). 
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[Table 5] 
[Figure 2] 
The results for both models are qualitatively similar. Specifically, both models show that R&D captures the 
main incentive to demand excessive cash.  In the OLS model, the coefficient of R&D is 0.734, implying that a 10% 
increase in the ratio of R&D to sales needs a $0.00734 increase in cash holdings (scaled by total assets).  The Beta 
model implies a $0.03977 increase in cash holdings for every 10% increase in the ratio of R&D to sales.  Net 
working capital, capital expenditures, leverage, and acquisition activities have strong negative coefficients.  The less 
net working capital, the more cash holdings.  This result implies that firms hoarding more cash now than before 
have less inventory and receivables. In addition, the statistically significant coefficients of capital expenditures (-
0.677 (OLS); -5.112 (Beta)) and acquisition expenditures (-0.422 (OLS); -3.392 (Beta)) show that big investment 
expenses lead firms to consume their cash holdings, while there is a steady increase in cash holdings for the full 
sample over the period.  
Leverage can be negatively or positively related to cash holdings.  If firms have great hedge needs for future 
investment, they will prefer holding more cash than lowering leverage, leading to a positive relation between 
leverage and cash holdings.  However, if firms’ financing sources are restrained, to some extent these firms need to 
use cash to reduce their leverage in case of default.  The coefficient of Laglev estimated in our regressions is 
negative (p < 0.01 in both models), implying that average firms’ debt capacity is constrained and firms will spend 
more cash to reduce leverage. 
The coefficient of the dividend dummy is negative (p < 0.01). In general, dividend-paying firms hold less cash 
than non–dividend-paying firms, which is consistent with the OLS statistics of Bates et al. (2009). Dividend-paying 
firms are likely to have less financial distress. For that reason, they have less incentive to save cash for paying 
dividends.  The relation between cash and industry cash flow risk is positive but insignificant in both models.  This 
result may due to the sample including IPO firms, which are likely to be cash rich immediately after the IPO.  We 
examine this issue later.  We find that Own is positively related and Own2 is negatively related to Cash, but both 
relations are not statistically significant in either model (in line with Opler et al. 1999)19.  Overall, both models show 
                                                            
19 Opler et al. (1999) find that cash holdings are positively related to low levels of managerial ownership (the low 
level of ownership is defined as a benchmark of 5%).  At high levels of ownership, cash holdings are negatively 
related to ownership. 
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similar effects of firm characteristics on cash holdings.  Since the Beta model considers the shape of the non-normal 
distribution of cash holdings, we use the Beta model for all subsequent regression analyses. 
4.2 Does CEO optimism lead firms to save and use cash differently? 
To examine whether CEO optimism influences their motives for corporate cash holdings, we extend the Beta 
regression model in Table 5 by including the interaction terms of the firm characteristics with CEO optimism 
dummy variable.  Results are shown in Table 6. Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 provide regression results of equation (1).  
We find that the CEO optimism effect does not affect the overall cash holdings (which can be seen from the 
estimated coefficient on the optimism dummy variable, D).  However, results show that R&D is the crucial 
determinant that leads the optimistic group to have increased cash hoards over the sample period. The coefficient on 
D*R&D in Model 1 (100% CEO optimism cutoff) is statistically significant, suggesting that firms with optimistic 
managers have a greater incentive to save for growth opportunities.  It is approximately 13.83 cents more than firms 
with non-optimistic managers for each 10% increase for R&D.  Consistent with Ferris et al. (2013), firms with 
optimistic managers undertake more cash-financed acquisition activities.  The estimate of D*Acq in Model 1 shows 
that they use 10.82 cents (p < 0.05) more for each 10% invested in acquisitions than non-optimistic-CEO firms.  
These findings indicate that firms governed by optimistic managers have higher propensities to save for growth 
opportunities and more large and cash-financed deals than other managers, and can explain the variability in cash 
holdings seen in Figure 1.  Coefficients on D*Indusig and D*Own are -2.049 (p<0.10) and -3.636 (p<0.05), 
indicating optimistic-CEO firms have fewer precautionary savings and save less with increases in the CEO’s 
ownership percentage than non-optimistic-CEO firms. Only the results with R&D remain significant when we use a 
wider CEO optimism cutoff (upper the 67% moneyness).20 This means that only the extremely optimistic group has 
this characteristic.  
[Table 6] 
So far, we found that optimistic managers and non-optimistic managers have different cash holding motives.  
Our next examination is on whether optimistic managers vary firms’ cash balances over time more than non-
                                                            
20 We also examined the model with year and industry fixed effects (with clustered by firm standard errors) with the 
addition of R&D fixed effects to control for the possibility that the relation between R&D, optimism and cash 
holdings is being driven by R&D intensive firms. The fixed effects partition the firms into five groups, zero R&D 
activity and four quartiles of positive R&D activity. We find that optimistic managers, even in low R&D intensive 
firms, have higher cash holdings for R&D than do non-optimistic managers. 
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optimistic managers.  Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 re-estimate Models 1 and 2 using the absolute cash ratio change.21  
We replace laglev with Lev (leverage in year t) as there is no endogeneity issue with cash change.  Model 3 shows 
that the 1.61 (p < 0.05) greater variation in cash balances is explained by R&D for firms with optimistic managers.  
This test further supports those findings that the optimistic group has relatively volatile cash balances, as seen earlier 
in Figure 1 and the results in Table 6.  When the optimism boundary is relaxed to 67%, the coefficient of R&D is 
insignificant.  This implies that cash balances are sensitive to a relatively stronger level of the CEO optimistic effect.  
4.3 Model specification robustness	
Our sample heretofore contains some firms that have gone public within the last five years and their cash holdings 
are thus at a high level because of lumpy capital raising.  In theory, these IPO firms are cash rich and have no need 
to save cash from holding less non-cash net working capital. In this section, we exclude young firms in our sample 
to eliminate the specific effect attributable to IPO firms.  Using the sample of non-IPO firms, we control three issues 
to strengthen our test on the CEO optimism effect on corporate cash holdings motives.  We incorporate net 
issuances to assets to control for the possibility that the increase in cash holdings may result from issuing more 
equity and debt.  The net issuances (NI) are measured as the total of debt issuance and equity sales minus the sum of 
debt retirement and equity repurchases.  The bottom tail of NI is winsorized at the 1% level.     
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 augment equation (1) by including the net issuance variable. With this adjusted 
specification, the optimistic group continues to have a stronger savings motive for growth opportunities and uses 
more cash-financed capital investment and acquisitions than the non-optimistic group.  There is a significant 
difference in the increase in cash through debt and equity issuance between the optimistic and non-optimistic 
samples.  Since external funds are limited to optimistic-manager firms, these firms intend to save more cash out of 
cash flow and save more money raised from issuance. Furthermore, an estimate of -0.551 (p < 0.10) for D*NWC 
indicates that optimistic managers hold even fewer inventories and receivables than non-optimistic managers.  This 
is because optimistic managers lean excessively on internal funds, which leads them to act as though they are 
financially constrained.  As such, the likelihood that these firms would substitute net working capital for cash 
increases because net working capital consists of non-cash financial assets.  The precautionary savings motive is 
negatively associated with an increase in cash at the 5% significance level, signalling that the desire to undertake 
                                                            
21 The absolute cash ratio change is defined as the absolute value of the current cash ratio minus the lagged cash 
ratio. Our data period for calculating the absolute cash change is between 1992 and 2010 and so the final sample 
period for this absolute-cash-change model is from 1993 to 2010.   
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precautionary savings is relatively weak for optimistic managers.  This finding is in line with the theory that 
optimistic managers underestimate the inherent uncertainty and riskiness of earnings (e.g., Heaton 2002; Goel and 
Thakor 2008; Hackbarth 2008; Gervais et al. 2011).   
[Table 7] 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients of D*Own and D*Own2 are -3.557 (p < 0.05) and 10.359 (p < 0.10) in 
this specification.  These results show that CEO optimism has an effect on the relationship between cash holdings 
and managerial ownership.  We recall that the positive part of the concave relation (between cash holdings and 
ownership percentage) for non-optimistic managers comes from the increase in managerial risk aversion. Optimistic 
managers, however, are relatively less risk averse than non-optimistic managers.  Consistently we do not find the 
concave relation with the CEO optimism effect.  Instead, a convex relation between cash holdings and ownership 
percentage is statistically significant in the optimistic group. The negative part of the convex relation possibly shows 
that optimistic managers are concerned with the cost of cash holdings with moderate levels of ownership.  The 
positive part of the convex relation can possibly be derived from the increasing level of risk aversion by holding 
more shares.  It then causes optimistic managers to hold more cash when their ownership increases.   
With the 67% CEO optimism cutoff, the industry sigma and NWC variables that proxy for precautionary 
savings and substitution for cash, respectively, are insignificant for optimistic managers. This result indicates that 
the relation between optimism and underestimation of risk depends upon the definition of optimism.  Similarly, 
optimistic CEOs’ cash demand from internal liquid assets seems to relate to how excessively optimistic CEOs are 
about future investment opportunities.  We also note that the Chi-square value is slightly higher with this NI 
specification.    
Malmendier et al. (2011) have addressed the issue that if overconfident CEOs are debt and equity conservative, 
then they would prefer using internal finance rather than external finance. Our second augmented specification 
allows us to test the relation between debt conservatism and the CEO optimism effect on cash holding motives.   We 
incorporate debt conservatism, measured by the variable (Kink), and its interaction with the CEO optimism effect (D) 
into the model. Kink is the amount of interest required to make the tax rate function slope downward, divided by the 
actual interest expense (Graham 2000).  The greater the value of Kink, the more debt conservative the firm is.22  We 
                                                            
22 The variable Kink was developed by John Graham and is available until 2009.  Our sample period for examining 
this specification therefore ends in 2009. We would like to thank John Graham for providing us with the Kink data. 
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match our previous non-IPO sample with kink data and obtain 4,827 firm–year observations between 1993 and 2009.  
We compute the Pearson–Spearman correlations between Kink and the presented cash holdings variables. 23  These 
results show that Kink is not highly correlated with our variables, thus allowing Kink to be added to our regression 
models as another explanatory variable without collinearity concerns. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 7 present results to include the variables Kink and D*Kink for the 100% and 67% 
cutoffs, respectively.  Results are consistent with our findings that the motives for cash holdings are significantly 
different between optimistic and non-optimistic managers, even when optimistic managers are debt conservative. An 
alternative way to examine whether the results are not driven by debt conservatism is to have the three-way 
interactions (CEO optimism, cash holdings controls, and Kink) included in the model.  Results are reported in the 
Appendix 3. We find a relatively low effect (in the 100% cutoff) or even no significant effect (in the 67% cutoff) of 
debt conservatism on the sensitivity of cash holdings and growth opportunities for the optimistic sample.  This 
finding indicates that debt conservatism is not the main reason optimistic managers hoard cash for growth 
opportunities.  We therefore document that the incentive for firms with optimistic managers to hold more cash for 
growth opportunities does not appear to be heavily influenced by firm debt conservatism.  We also find that 
companies with more acquisition expenses and a higher leverage ratio are less responsive to cash hoarding in 
determining firm debt conservatism.   
Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) document that excess cash holdings are mainly for future cash flow shocks in 
bad times while credit lines are used for future investment potentials when times are good.  Although the focus of 
our study and theirs is different, controlling for market-type factors can help us analyze the sensitivity of firm 
characteristics determining cash holdings to market conditions.  
For Models 5 and 6 of Table 7, we employ four proxies for market conditions on top of the inclusion of net 
issuances and debt conservatism to the regression model based on the 100% and 67% cutoff, respectively.  The first 
two measures are current and lagged buy-and-hold market returns; the last two are current and lagged standard 
deviations of market returns.  We compute the product of the monthly CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/Arca value-
weighted market index over one year and over one lagged year, corresponding to the firm fiscal year buy-and-hold 
returns (BHR) and one-year-lagged buy-and-hold returns (lagBHR), respectively.  We also calculate the standard 
deviations of the monthly CRSP market index over one year and over one lagged year to capture market volatility 
                                                            
23 The Pearson-Spearman correlations table is available upon request. 
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(Stdev) and one-year-lagged market volatility (lagStdev), respectively.  The results based on the 100% cutoff remain 
qualitatively similar to those without the market conditions variables in Table 7.  The extremely optimistic group is 
found to have distinct cash holding behavior for growth opportunities and precautionary motives.  This result is not 
repeated in the 67% cutoff, which suggests that corporate cash policies are sensitive to the definition of CEO 
optimism.  We also find that the optimistic group would save more cash when times are bad (the estimates of 
D*lagBHR are 0.383, p < 0.05 in the 100% cutoff and 0.434, p <0.01 in the 67% cutoff).   
4.4 Robustness to an alternative measure of optimism 
We use an alternative measure of CEO optimism as a robustness check for the effect of CEO optimism on corporate 
cash holdings and find further consistency in our results.  Our alternative measure comes from the work of Campbell 
et al. (2011) who suggest firm characteristic as another managerial optimism measure. Goel and Thakor (2008) 
document that firms with extremely overconfident managers tend to overinvest in risky projects.  Thus, corporate 
decisions on investment inputs could be influenced by CEO optimism (e.g., Campbell et al. 2011; Gervais et al. 
2011).  The work of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), Malmendier et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) also 
indicates that the relation between overconfidence and investments is positive.  With this important notion in mind, 
we use firm investment inputs to construct the alternative measure of CEO optimism. 
To begin, we sort firms each year based on three separate industry-adjusted investment rates: (i) the capital 
investment rate (used in Campbell et al. 2011), (ii) the acquisition investment rate, and (iii) the R&D investment 
rate.24  We identify optimistic managers as those for firms in the union of the top quintiles of each of the three 
investment rate groups for one year or two consecutive years, respectively. In Table 8, Model 1 reports the results 
where firms are in the top group of investment rate for one year while Model 2 restricts the requirement to two 
consecutive years.  This method yields a sample of 4,736 (4,695) total CEO–firm–year observations for Model 1 (2) 
and there are 954 (847) in the optimism sub-sample. 
[Table 8] 
We find results consistent with the earlier findings that CEO optimism leads firms to have different cash 
holdings models. That is, using capital expenditures/acquisitions/R&D expenses to classify optimistic managers, we 
                                                            
24 The industry-adjusted capital (acquisition; R&D) investment rate is defined as the capital (acquisition; R&D) 
investment rate minus the median of capital (acquisition; R&D) investment rates in the same industry.  Capital 
expenditures are scaled by property, plant, and equipment; acquisition and R&D expenses are scaled by book assets.   
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find evidence similar to that of our main analysis: Firms with optimistic managers save more cash for R&D 
opportunities.  Moreover, the optimistic group pays less cash dividends than the non-optimistic group, which is 
consistent to the finding of Deshmukh et al. (2010) that optimistic managers highly value their cash for investments 
than as dividends. We highlight another finding: that the optimistic group’s cash holdings are significantly more 
sensitive to the lagged market returns and the lagged variation in market conditions than the non-optimistic group.  
The potential explanation is that it is relatively costly for investment-intensive optimistic firms to adjust the flows of 
investment since their financial policies are less flexible than others.  To insure smooth investments when markets 
are volatile, these investment-intensive optimistic firms prefer to hold high cash balances.  This finding is consistent 
with Brown and Peterson (2011), who find that R&D smoothing with cash reserves is particularly valued by 
financially constrained firms.  Most importantly, our study is the first to link the characteristic of CEO optimism to 
the market fluctuation sensitivity of investment-intensive firms. The optimism measure based on firm level data 
provides new insights into the role of high-investment optimistic firms’ cash holdings on investment smoothing.  
Finally, we note that by controlling for managerial ownership, CEO optimism slightly impacts the relation between 
cash holdings and managerial ownership. However, only the coefficient of D*Own is significant (p < 10%) in the 
case of being in the top quintile investment rate of group for one year.  
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we examine the CEO optimism effect on cash holdings between 1992 and 2010.  Our main results 
show that CEO optimism leads firms to save and allocate their cash distinctly from other firms; in particular, their 
cash holdings are greater and more volatile. This finding is consistent with the opposing incentives to underinvest 
when external finance undervalues the firm and to overinvest as a manager overestimates future earnings.  CEO 
optimism is found to have a statistically significant effect on corporate cash holding behavior.  Our results are robust 
to alternative optimism measures. 
In our examination of the impact of CEO optimism on cash holdings, the cash holdings of firms with optimistic 
managers are mostly used to fund growth opportunities. These firms save more cash for R&D than firms with non-
optimistic managers.  This result is echoed in the time variation in cash holdings that is seen to strongly mirror 
movements in R&D expenditures for firms with optimistic managers.  
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Further investigation uses a sample without IPO firms as these firms are normally cash rich.  We include more 
control variables step by step in order to further ensure robustness. First, we showed that net issuances play an 
important role in increasing cash holdings.  Since optimistic managers are reluctant to seek for external funds, 
restricted financing behavior leads them to increase their cash used for investments, such as acquisitions and capital 
expenditures.  Moreover, firms with optimistic managers require less cash reserves for precautionary savings and 
inventories and receivables. By contrast, firms with non-optimistic managers seem to hold more cash for 
precautionary savings purposes.  Second, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that 
optimistic managers’ cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively.  More notably, we 
document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic managers do. In other words, 
the relation between corporate cash policy and CEO optimism is slightly sensitive to the market timing.  Our final 
robustness tests support our main findings and suggest that investment-intensive optimistic firms would hold more 
cash for investment smoothing than non-optimistic firms. 
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Fig. 1 Average cash ratios and R&D expenditures ratios of optimistic and non-optimistic groups 
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Fig. 2 The distr ibution of cash for the whole sample including optimistic and non-optimistic managers  
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Table 1 Data selection 
 
This table summarizes the steps of sampling compensation data (CEO information) from the ExecuComp and 
company data from the CRSP/Compustat merged database from 1992 to 2010.  We exclude firms with SIC codes 
4000–4999 (utilities firms) and 6000–6999 (financial firms).  Note that there are duplicate firms but unique firm–year 
observations between optimistic and non-optimistic groups. 
* The non-optimistic sample of 4,902 observations features 1,120 firms. 
** The optimism sample of 1,001 observations features 407 firms. 
*** For the 67% bound:  The non-optimistic sample includes 4,320 observations and 1,076 firms. The optimism 
sample includes 1,583 observations and 560 firms. 
 
 
  No. Firms Observations 
All CEOs available in the ExecuComp database from 1992 to 2010 3,190 29,416 
Less: with SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999 (907) (7,562) 
Subtotal 2,283 21,854 
Less: without option data  (87) (2,793) 
Subtotal 2,196 19,061 
Less: without valid stock close price or  moneyness data  (4) (89) 
Subtotal 2,192 18,972 
Less: without compensation data for at least two years (125) (692) 
Subtotal 2,067 18,280 
Less: without valid firm-level data from CRSP/Compustat (604) (9,376) 
Subtotal 1,463 8,904 
Less: firms with only one year of data (183) (183) 
Subtotal 1,280 8,721 
Less: not valid R&D/sales computed (3) (23) 
Subtotal 1,277 8,698 
Less: without managerial ownership data (42) (1,976) 
Subtotal 1,230 6,722 
Less: missing data after obtaining lagged leverage for an endogeneity issue (36) (819) 
Subtotal 1,194 5,903 
Less: non-optimistic sample that has moneyness less than 100% or only 100% 
moneyness once*** 
- (4,902)* 
Total: optimistic sample (firm–year observations) for the 100% bound*** - 1,001** 
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Table 2 Summary statistics for optimistic and non-optimistic groups 
Variables Mean 1st Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile    Std  Mean 
1st 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile    Std 
t-Test on Two 
Groups 
100% cutoff Optimistic group (no. of firms = 407; Obs. = 1,001)  Non-optimistic group (no. of firms = 1,120; Obs. = 4,902)  
Cash  0.145 0.025 0.087 0.211 0.157 0.120 0.020 0.060 0.165 0.146 -4.56*** 
Q 3.216 1.803 2.651 4.015 1.908 1.943 1.231 1.602 2.258 1.167 -20.35*** 
Size 7.297 6.311 7.124 8.129 1.346 7.357 6.351 7.220 8.284 1.472 1.26 
Cashflow 0.123 0.089 0.119 0.152 0.060 0.080 0.051 0.083 0.116 0.074 -19.81*** 
NWC 0.102 0.004 0.086 0.194 0.143 0.103 0.001 0.091 0.196 0.152 0.24 
Capex 0.069 0.031 0.052 0.088 0.058 0.055 0.023 0.041 0.070 0.049 -7.41*** 
Laglev 0.183 0.040 0.165 0.282 0.162 0.227 0.076 0.216 0.335 0.181 7.63*** 
R&D 0.036 0.000 0.001 0.054 0.058 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.058 -3.60*** 
Divdu 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.595 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.491 6.10*** 
Acq 0.042 0.000 0.004 0.051 0.076 0.028 0.000 0.001 0.024 0.059 -5.79*** 
Indusig 0.083 0.052 0.084 0.107 0.035 0.078 0.046 0.073 0.102 0.038 -3.63*** 
Own 0.024 0.002 0.006 0.022 0.046 0.023 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.059 -0.66 
Own2 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 2.93*** 
67% cutoff Optimistic group (no. of firms = 560; Obs. = 1,583)  Non-optimistic group (no. of firms = 1,076; Obs. = 4,320)  
Cash  0.129 0.022 0.069 0.188 0.150 0.122 0.020 0.061 0.170 0.148 -1.65* 
Q 2.883 1.667 2.324 3.502 1.723 1.893 1.204 1.563 2.157 1.162 -21.16*** 
Size 7.416 6.398 7.276 8.284 1.390 7.322 6.322 7.184 8.246 1.473 -2.26** 
Cashflow 0.115 0.082 0.111 0.144 0.061 0.077 0.049 0.080 0.114 0.076 -19.92*** 
NWC 0.098 -0.002 0.084 0.190 0.145 0.105 0.004 0.092 0.198 0.152 1.62 
Capex 0.066 0.028 0.050 0.085 0.056 0.054 0.023 0.040 0.069 0.048 -7.44*** 
Laglev 0.196 0.060 0.183 0.294 0.160 0.228 0.073 0.216 0.339 0.185 6.50*** 
R&D 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.054 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.060 -0.64 
Divdu 0.543 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.498 0.590 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.492 3.23*** 
Acq 0.041 0.000 0.004 0.047 0.074 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.057 -7.02*** 
Indusig 0.081 0.050 0.081 0.103 0.035 0.079 0.046 0.073 0.102 0.038 -1.89* 
Own 0.023 0.001 0.005 0.019 0.049 0.023 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.059 0.03 
Own2 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 2.26** 
The sample includes CRSP/Compustat firm–year observations from 1992 to 2010.  We define CEOs as optimistic (non-optimistic) if they hold exercisable options that 
have more (less) than 100% or 67% moneyness. The variable Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio; Q is the market-to-book ratio; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Cashflow 
is operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, all divided by total assets; NWC is working 
capital from balance sheets minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets; Capex is capital expenditures scaled by total assets; Laglev is the one-year lagged 
value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets; R&D is R&D expenditures divided by sales; Divdu is a dividend dummy that equals to 
1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero; Acq is acquisitions divided by total assets; Indusig is the industry cash flow risk; Own and Own2 are CEO ownership percentage 
and the square of ownership percentage, respectively. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The last column reports the t-values of means tests between the 
optimistic and non-optimistic groups across variables. The respective superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.    
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Table 3 Pearson correlation matrix 
Panel A: 100% Cutoff                 
Optimistic group 
Cash Q Size Cashflow NWC Capex Laglev R&D Divdu Acq Indusig Own Own2 Kink BHR LagBHR Stdev Lagstdev 
N
o
n
-
o
p
t
i
m
i
s
t
i
c
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
Cash  0.43*** -0.21*** 0.08* -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.39*** 0.53*** -0.16*** -0.24*** 0.25*** -0.03 -0.02 0.38*** 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.12*** 
Q 0.32*** -0.06 0.32*** -0.17*** -0.08** -0.30*** 0.41*** -0.04 -0.10** 0.26*** -0.05 -0.06 0.45*** 0.08* 0.07* 0.09** 0.13*** 
Size -0.24*** -0.02  -0.11*** -0.32*** 0.08* 0.19*** 0.00 0.24*** -0.01 -0.08** -0.24*** -0.11*** -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
Cashflow -0.10*** 0.32*** 0.08***  -0.01 0.29*** -0.18*** 0.02 -0.07* -0.14*** 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.26*** -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
NWC -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.34*** 0.04*  -0.17*** -0.05 -0.13*** 0.05 -0.05 -0.06* 0.09** 0.08* -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.02 
Capex -0.18*** 0.00 -0.01 0.26*** -0.18***  0.04 -0.15*** -0.01 -0.19*** -0.13*** 0.04 0.01 -0.08* 0.02 0.07* -0.08* -0.15*** 
LagLev -0.37*** -0.12*** 0.20*** -0.09*** -0.16*** -0.01  -0.26*** -0.11** 0.04 -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.09** -0.45*** -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
R&D 0.50*** 0.23*** -0.10*** -0.19*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.18***  -0.17*** 0.00 0.44*** -0.10** -0.07* 0.36*** 0.03 0.02 0.08* 0.09** 
Divdu -0.23*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.26***  0.00 0.00 -0.08* -0.04 0.10** 0.07* 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Acq -0.13*** -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04* -0.12*** -0.05** 0.02 0.02  0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.11*** -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
Indusig 0.23*** 0.11*** -0.10*** -0.04** -0.10*** -0.02 -0.07*** 0.36*** -0.13*** 0.05**  -0.04 -0.02 0.20*** 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.05 
Own 0.07*** 0.05** -0.23*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.01 -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.03* -0.03 -0.03*  0.89*** -0.05 -0.09** -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
Own2 0.04** 0.04** -0.13*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.02 -0.06*** -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.89***  -0.05 -0.08** -0.03 0.03 -0.03 
Kink 0.29*** 0.42*** -0.04* 0.17*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.39*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.03* 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.07***  -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.10** 
BHR -0.03* 0.04* -0.06*** -0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.00 -0.02 0.07*** 0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.01 -0.04**  0.12*** -0.42*** -0.06* 
LagBHR -0.09*** -0.01 -0.09*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.11*** -0.03 -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.03 0.01  -0.15*** -0.45*** 
Stdev 0.01 -0.04** 0.03* 0.00 -0.02 -0.03* 0.05*** 0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.03* -0.48*** -0.32***  0.52*** 
Lagstdev -0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.03* -0.03 -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.00 -0.05*** -0.03 -0.11*** 0.00 0.00 -0.07*** 0.06*** -0.55*** 0.50***  
                    
Panel B: 67% Cutoff                 
Optimistic group 
Cash Q Size Cashflow NWC Capex Laglev R&D Divdu Acq Indusig Own Own2 Kink BHR LagBHR Stdev Lagstdev 
N
o
n
-
o
p
t
i
m
i
s
t
i
c
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
Cash 0.44*** -0.24*** 0.04 -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.38*** 0.53*** -0.19*** -0.20*** 0.27*** -0.01 -0.02 0.35*** 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.10*** 
Q 0.32***  -0.08*** 0.33*** -0.20*** -0.04 -0.29*** 0.40*** -0.08** -0.07** 0.24*** -0.05 -0.06* 0.46*** 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.09*** 
Size -0.23*** -0.02  -0.11*** -0.34*** 0.06* 0.18*** -0.07** 0.26*** -0.01 -0.11*** -0.24*** -0.13*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 
Cashflow -0.10*** 0.31*** 0.09***  -0.02 0.31*** -0.16*** 0.00 -0.12*** -0.10*** 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.24*** -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
NWC -0.17*** -0.10*** -0.34*** 0.06***  -0.16*** -0.06* -0.10*** 0.02 -0.04 -0.06** 0.10*** 0.07** -0.07** 0.00 0.07** 0.00 -0.03 
Capex -0.17*** 0.00 -0.02 0.25*** -0.18***  0.02 -0.14*** -0.02 -0.19*** -0.11*** 0.04 0.01 -0.07** 0.01 0.06* -0.04 -0.10*** 
LagLev -0.37*** -0.11*** 0.21*** -0.09*** -0.17*** -0.01  -0.24*** -0.09** 0.01 -0.14*** -0.05 -0.03 -0.44*** -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
R&D 0.50*** 0.23*** -0.09*** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.18***  -0.19*** 0.03 0.42*** -0.07** -0.05* 0.32*** 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05* 
Divdu -0.23*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.27***  0.00 -0.05* -0.10*** -0.04 0.09*** 0.05* 0.03 -0.05* -0.07** 
Acq -0.13*** -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04* -0.11*** -0.05** 0.02 0.02  0.08** -0.03 -0.05 -0.06* 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
Indusig 0.23*** 0.11*** -0.10*** -0.04* -0.11*** -0.01 -0.08*** 0.36*** -0.13*** 0.03*  -0.01 -0.01 0.17*** 0.05* 0.02 -0.01 -0.05* 
Own 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.22*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.04*  0.89*** -0.06** -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.00 
Own2 0.05** 0.06*** -0.13*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.02 -0.07*** -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.89***  -0.07** -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Kink 0.30*** 0.41*** -0.05** 0.16*** 0.02 -0.06*** -0.39*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.09***  -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 
BHR -0.04* 0.03* -0.07*** -0.03 0.04* 0.04** 0.00 -0.03* 0.08*** 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.05**  0.06* -0.43*** -0.02 
LagBHR -0.09*** 0.00 -0.10*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.03 -0.06*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 0.03 0.01  -0.19*** -0.49*** 
Stdev 0.01 -0.04* 0.04* 0.00 -0.03 -0.04* 0.05** 0.01 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.48*** -0.33***  0.52*** 
Lagstdev -0.02 -0.04** 0.03* -0.04* -0.02 -0.07*** 0.10*** 0.00 -0.04** -0.03 -0.12*** -0.01 0.00 -0.06*** 0.07*** -0.55*** 0.50***  
This table summarizes a set of Pearson correlations matrices for the optimistic and non-optimistic groups, respectively.  Correlations among the independent variables and 
Cash for the optimistic group are above the leading diagonal of the correlation matrix, while the corresponding correlations for the non-optimistic group are below the 
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leading diagonal. Firm–years are in the optimistic group if the manager’s option holding moneyness is above 100% (Panel A) or 67% (Panel B); otherwise they are in the 
non-optimistic groups. Variables include Cash (the cash-to-assets ratio), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (operating income 
before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet 
minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt 
plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise 
zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), NI (debt issuance plus 
equity sales minus debt retirement and minus equity repurchases, divided by total assets), the interaction terms (defined as D interacted with each independent variable), 
Kink (debt conservatism), BHR (the buy-and-hold market returns), lagBHR (one-year lagged BHR), Stdev (the standard deviation of market index returns), and lagStdev 
(one-year lagged Stdev). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Average Cash Ratios from 1992 to 2010 
 
  Full sample  Optimistic group  Non-optimistic group 
Year N 
Average 
Cash 
Ratio 
 
Of N 
Average 
Cash 
Ratio 
Δ Average 
Cash Ratio 
 
Of N 
Average 
Cash 
Ratio 
Δ Average 
Cash Ratio 
1993 150 0.087  10.67% 0.126   89.33% 0.083  
1994 170 0.089  10.00% 0.127 0.001  90.00% 0.085 0.002 
1995 171 0.093  16.37% 0.153 0.026  83.63% 0.081 -0.004 
1996 194 0.093  19.59% 0.133 -0.02  80.41% 0.083 0.002 
1997 242 0.098  25.21% 0.117 -0.016  74.79% 0.091 0.008 
1998 358 0.094  19.27% 0.129 0.012  80.73% 0.086 -0.005 
1999 360 0.093  18.89% 0.178 0.049  81.11% 0.073 -0.013 
2000 371 0.094  19.14% 0.181 0.003  80.86% 0.074 0.001 
2001 374 0.112  17.38% 0.17 -0.011  82.62% 0.100 0.026 
2002 399 0.133  12.53% 0.146 -0.024  87.47% 0.132 0.032 
2003 433 0.145  17.78% 0.186 0.040  82.22% 0.136 0.004 
2004 427 0.146  20.84% 0.16 -0.026  79.16% 0.143 0.007 
2005 452 0.144  23.23% 0.137 -0.023  76.77% 0.147 0.004 
2006 393 0.133  22.39% 0.115 -0.022  77.61% 0.138 -0.009 
2007 500 0.137  18.60% 0.103 -0.012  81.40% 0.145 0.007 
2008 462 0.137  7.58% 0.125 0.022  92.42% 0.138 -0.007 
2009 447 0.169  6.94% 0.156 0.031  93.06% 0.17 0.032 
Mean 347 0.117  16.85% 0.144 0.002  83.15% 0.112 0.005 
Std.   0.026  0.053 0.024 0.024  0.053 0.031 0.013 
t-Test: two-sample test of equality of means (optimistic versus  non-optimistic groups) assuming unequal variances: 
  Average cash ratio ݐ ൌ 3.192 ݌ െ value ൌ 0.003
  Δ Average cash ratio ݐ ൌ െ0.500 ݌ െ value ൌ 0.621 
F-Test: two sample test of equality of variances (optimistic versus non-optimistic groups): 
  Average cash ratio ܨଵ଺,ଵ଺ ൌ 0.608 ݌ െ value ൌ 0.329 
  
Δ Average cash ratio ܨଵହ,ଵହ ൌ 3.367 ݌ െ value ൌ 0.025 
This table reports the number of observations and average cash ratios (the mean of each firm–year 
observation’s ratio of cash holdings to total assets) for the full sample and the two sub-samples (optimistic and 
non-optimistic groups) from 1992 to 2010.  We also present the change in (Δ) the average cash ratio for the two 
sub-samples.  The total number of observations in the full sample is 5,903, including an optimistic group of 
1,001 and a non-optimistic group of 4,902. After matching with managerial ownership data and estimating the 
one-year lagged leverage, the effective period for our sample is between 1993 and 2009. 
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Table 5 Regression estimating the determinants of cash holdings without CEO optimism effect 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of Cash/Assets       
Mean 0.124 1st Quartile 0.020 Skewness 1.921 
Min 0.000 Median 0.064 Std 0.149 
Max 0.918 3rd Quartile 0.175 Kurtosis 6.957 
Panel B: Regressions         
Model 1 2 
(OLS) (Beta) 
Dependent variable  Cash/Assets Cash/Assets 
      
Q   0.018***  0.126***  
(0.003) (0.015) 
Size -0.020*** -0.113*** 
(0.003) (0.017) 
Cashflow -0.052 0.049 
(0.055) (0.335) 
NWC -0.298*** -1.958*** 
(0.027) (0.185) 
Capex -0.677*** -5.112*** 
(0.071) (0.500) 
Laglev -0.218*** -2.065*** 
(0.022) (0.169) 
R&D 0.734*** 3.977*** 
(0.077) (0.457) 
Divdu -0.021*** -0.166*** 
(0.006) (0.045) 
Acq -0.422*** -3.392*** 
(0.025) (0.196) 
Indusig 0.024 0.435 
(0.079) (0.622) 
Own 0.194 0.615 
(0.147) (0.998) 
Own2 -0.289 -0.559 
(0.254) (1.929) 
Total Obs. 5,903 5,842 
Adj. R-squared (OLS); Chi-2(Beta) 0.528   2451.3***   
The dependent variable in all regressions is the cash-to-asset ratio.  The independent variables include Q (the 
market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (operating income before depreciation minus 
total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, divided by total assets), NWC 
(working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 
if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow 
risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), and Own2 (the square of Own). All variable definitions are given in the 
Appendix 1.  This model includes year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
firm are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 6 Regressions estimating determinants of cash holdings with CEO optimism effect: baseline results 
 
Model 
CEO optimism cutoff 
1 
100% Cutoff 
2 
67% Cutoff 
3 
100% Cutoff 
4 
67% Cutoff 
Dependent variable Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Absolute Cash Changes 
Absolute Cash 
Changes 
D 0.032 -0.041 -0.031 -0.032 
  (0.066) (0.058) (0.049) (0.043) 
D*Q -0.035 -0.031 -0.052** -0.038 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
D*Size -0.072** -0.055* -0.026 -0.011 
  (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) 
D*Cashflow 0.387 -0.366 1.283 1.603** 
  (0.665) (0.605) (0.900) (0.730) 
D*NWC -0.339 -0.063 -0.072 -0.043 
  (0.295) (0.279) (0.301) (0.276) 
D*Capex -0.129 0.164 -0.746 -1.410** 
  (0.687) (0.638) (0.675) (0.656) 
D*Laglev 0.296 0.308   
  (0.250) (0.224)   
D*Lev   -0.273 -0.222 
   (0.255) (0.265) 
D*R&D 1.383* 1.248* 1.610** 1.012 
  (0.789) (0.718) (0.769) (0.676) 
D*Divdu 0.124 0.086 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.078) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) 
D*Acq -1.082** -0.531 0.463 0.455 
  (0.438) (0.365) (0.575) (0.542) 
D*Indusig -2.049* -0.058 0.210 -0.370 
 (1.130) (0.974) (1.065) (0.910) 
D*Own -3.636** -2.295 -1.660 -1.481 
 (1.710) (1.436) (1.713) (1.709) 
D*Own2 9.374 5.547 6.946 4.975 
 (6.147) (3.466) (5.359) (4.807) 
Optimistic/Total Obs. 987/5,842 1,563/5,842 978/5,840 1,259/4,683 
Chi-2 2706.4*** 2691.4*** 1036.9*** 626.9*** 
The sample includes CEO–year data from ExecuComp and firm–year data from the CRSP/Compustat merged 
database between 1992 and 2010. We exclude utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4990) and financial firms (SIC codes 
6000–6990).  For the dependent variable, models 1 and 2 use the cash-to-assets ratio while models 3 and 4 use the 
absolute change in cash holdings (the difference between current cash ratio and lagged cash ratio).  The independent 
variables include D (CEO optimism dummy), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), 
Cashflow (operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related expenses minus total income taxes 
minus dividends, divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term 
investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Lev (total long-term debt plus debt 
in current liabilities, divided by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of Lev), R&D (R&D expenditures 
divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions 
divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of 
Own), and the interaction terms (defined as D interacted with each independent variable). All variable definitions are 
given in the Appendix 1.  The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses.  The 
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. To save space, this table 
only displays the results for D and variables interacting with D. All regressions include cash holdings controls, year 
and industry fixed effects. The full results are available upon request. 
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Table 7 Regressions estimating determinants of cash holdings (excluding IPO Firms): Other specifications 
Model 
CEO optimism cutoff 
1 
100% Cutoff 
2 
67% Cutoff 
3 
100% Cutoff 
4 
67% Cutoff 
5 
100% Cutoff 
6 
67% Cutoff 
D -0.004 -0.056 -0.680*** -0.508** -0.634** -0.278 
  (0.069) (0.060) (0.257) (0.258) (0.281) (0.282) 
D*Q -0.033 -0.027 -0.033 -0.018 -0.039 -0.027 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) 
D*Size -0.054* -0.041 -0.066** -0.051 -0.066** -0.049 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
D*Cashflow 1.549** 0.351 1.265* 0.332 1.260* 0.311 
  (0.782) (0.716) (0.763) (0.716) (0.761) (0.714) 
D*NWC -0.551* -0.188 -0.488 -0.212 -0.536* -0.250 
  (0.289) (0.285) (0.313) (0.320) (0.307) (0.317) 
D*Capex -1.199 -0.556 -1.274* -0.854 -1.351* -0.919 
  (0.735) (0.696) (0.762) (0.727) (0.766) (0.731) 
D*Laglev 0.395 0.399* 0.308 0.263 0.296 0.236 
  (0.257) (0.234) (0.291) (0.281) (0.292) (0.282) 
D*R&D 1.364* 1.216* 1.414* 1.302* 1.394* 1.232 
  (0.780) (0.715) (0.826) (0.785) (0.831) (0.782) 
D*Divdu 0.108 0.063 0.188** 0.105 0.184** 0.097 
  (0.078) (0.071) (0.080) (0.074) (0.081) (0.074) 
D*Acq -2.509*** -1.581*** -2.957*** -1.905*** -3.004*** -1.923*** 
  (0.559) (0.503) (0.665) (0.650) (0.674) (0.667) 
D*Indusig -2.441** -0.364 -2.708** -0.645 -2.602** -0.500 
 (1.104) (0.979) (1.098) (0.988) (1.095) (0.987) 
D*Own -3.557** -2.479* -4.222** -3.328** -4.171** -3.353** 
 (1.640) (1.427) (1.746) (1.531) (1.768) (1.534) 
D*Own2 10.359* 6.574* 11.367* 8.696** 11.403* 8.900** 
 (5.706) (3.440) (5.845) (4.107) (5.977) (4.122) 
D*NI 1.696*** 1.308*** 1.522** 1.182 1.493** 1.132 
 (0.505) (0.487) (0.653) (0.723) (0.665) (0.749) 
D*Kink   -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 
   (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
D*BHR     -0.084 0.065 
     (0.202) (0.162) 
D*lagBHR     0.383** 0.434*** 
     (0.193) (0.166) 
D*Stdev     -2.222 0.472 
     (2.213) (1.893) 
D*lagStdev     2.984 3.841* 
     (2.488) (2.303) 
Kink control   √ √ √ √ 
Market conditions controls     √ √ 
Optimistic/Total Obs. 948/5,524 1,503/5,524  870/4,827  1,373/4,827  870/4,827  1,373/4,827 
Chi-2 3158.2*** 3077.7*** 2988.5*** 2837.7*** 3056.0*** 2929.0*** 
The dependent variable is the cash-to-assets ratio.  The reported independent variables are D (CEO optimism dummy), Q 
(the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (cash flow, divided by total assets), NWC (working 
capital from balance sheet - cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), 
R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy = 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise 0), Acq 
(acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the 
square of Own), NI (debt issuance + equity sales - debt retirement - equity repurchases, divided by total assets), the 
interaction terms (D interacted with each independent variable), Kink (debt conservatism), BHR (the buy-and-hold market 
returns), lagBHR (one-year lagged BHR), Stdev (the standard deviation of market index returns), and lagStdev (one-year 
lagged Stdev). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are 
reported in parentheses.  The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
To save space, this table only displays the results for D and variables interacting with D. All regressions include cash 
holdings controls, year and industry fixed effects. The full results are available upon request.  
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Table 8 Regressions of cash holdings: alternative CEO optimism measures based on investment inputs 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the cash-to-assets ratio.  Firms are sorted separately each year based on three 
industry-adjusted investment rates: (i) capital, (ii) acquisition, and (iii) R&D.  Optimism is defined if the firm belongs to 
at least one top quintile investment rate group for at least one or two successive years. The reported independent variables 
include D (CEO optimism dummy), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (cash flow, 
divided by total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet - cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), 
Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend dummy = 1 if a 
firm pays dividends, otherwise 0), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig (industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO 
ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), NI (debt issuance + equity sales - debt retirement - equity repurchases, 
divided by total assets), the interaction terms (D interacted with each independent variable), Kink (debt conservatism), 
BHR (the buy-and-hold market returns), lagBHR (one-year lagged BHR), Stdev (the standard deviation of market index 
returns), and lagStdev (one-year lagged Stdev). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  To save space, this table only display the results for variables interacting with the 
optimism dummy. All regressions include cash holdings controls, Kink controls, market conditions controls, and year and 
industry fixed effects. The full results are available upon request. 
 
Model   
In the top quintile investment rate group for 
1 
One year 
2 
Two successive years 
D 0.107 0.042 
 (0.119) (0.115) 
D*Q -0.028 -0.011 
 (0.046) (0.048) 
D*Size 0.024 -0.005 
 (0.038) (0.036) 
D*Cashflow 0.151 0.481 
 (0.657) (0.714) 
D*NWC -0.097 -0.251 
 (0.394) (0.390) 
D*Capex 0.143 0.121 
 (1.078) (1.145) 
D*Laglev 0.502 0.544 
 (0.437) (0.378) 
D*R&D 4.222* 2.108* 
 (2.295) (1.257) 
D*Divdu -0.279** -0.230** 
 (0.113) (0.113) 
D*Acq -0.539 -1.132 
 (0.697) (0.748) 
D*Indusig 0.021 0.261 
 (1.336) (1.448) 
D*Own -4.806* -4.740 
 (2.615) (2.951) 
D*Own2 18.878 19.283 
 (12.158) (14.685) 
D*NI -1.057 -0.049 
 (0.776) (0.596) 
D*Kink -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
D*BHR -0.267 -0.172 
 (0.170) (0.184) 
D*lagBHR 0.620*** 0.361* 
 (0.215) (0.211) 
D*Stdev -2.374 -2.450 
 (2.193) (2.448) 
D*lagStdev 6.903*** 5.717** 
 (2.655) (2.752) 
Optimistic/Total Obs. 954/4,736 847/4695 
Chi-2 2828.9*** 2809.2*** 
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Appendix 1 This table defines each variable utilized in the cash holdings model. A set of proxies is given in the 
last column, as well as the predicted relation with cash holdings. 
Variables Definition, Computation with Compustat Item Number(#) Proxy (Correlation with Cash) 
Cash Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets; #1/#6 Cash holdings 
Q Market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (market value 
of assets is the total of the book value of assets and the market value of 
equity minus the book value of equity; the book value of assets is total 
assets; the market value of equity is common shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price; the book value of equity is total common 
equity); [#6+(#25*#199)-#60]/#6. 
Investment opportunities (+) 
 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets; ln(#6). Economies of scale (-) 
Cashflow Operating income before depreciation minus total interest and related 
expenses minus total income taxes minus dividends, divided by total 
assets; (#13-#15-#16-#21)/#6. 
Earnings (+) 
Liquidity demand (-) 
NWC Working capital from balance sheets minus cash and short-term 
investments, divided by total assets; (#179-#1)/#6. 
Substitute for cash (-) 
Capex Capital expenditures scaled by total assets; #128/#6. Debt capacity (-) 
Financial distress costs (+) 
Investment opportunities (+) 
Lev The ratio of leverage to assets is measured as total long-term debt plus 
debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets; (#9+#34)/#6. 
Hedge needs for future investment 
against income shortfalls (- ; +) 
Laglev The one-year lagged value of Lev.  
R&D R&D expenditures divided by net sales; #46/#12 (set to zero if #46 is 
missing). 
Growth opportunities (+) 
Financial distress costs (+)  
Divdu Dividend payout dummy; if the company pays common dividends (#21), 
Divdu = 1; otherwise, Divdu = 0.  
Capital market accessibility (-) 
Acq Acquisitions divided by total assets; #129/#6. Cash outflows (-) 
Indusig Industry sigma (also named industry cash flow risk) is computed in two 
stages, the first calculating each firm’s standard deviation of cash flow to 
total assets over 10 years and the second grouping firms by two-digit SIC 
codes and calculating each group’s mean of standard deviations obtained. 
Precautionary savings (+) 
Own CEO ownership percentage is defined as shares owned by the executive, 
excluding options that are exercisable or will become exercisable within 
60 days, divided by the number of common shares outstanding as reported 
by the company; SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS/SHRSOUT (from the 
ExecuComp  “ANNCOMP” database). 
Managerial risk aversion (+)  
Own2 The square of Own. The cost of holding more cash (-) 
NI Debt issuance plus equity sales minus debt retirement and minus equity 
repurchases, divided by total assets; (#111+#108-#114-#115)/#6. 
Cash inflows (+) 
D Optimistic CEO–year dummy (i.e., D = 1 when the CEO holds an average 
percentage of exercised option moneyness of more than 100%, otherwise 
D = 0). Data for measuring optimism are from the ExecuComp and 
Compustat databases. 
 
Kink The ratio of the amount of interest required to make the tax rate function 
slope downward, divided by the actual interest expense (Kink data kindly 
provided by John Graham).  
Debt conservatism (+) 
BHR Buy-and-hold CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/Arca value-
weighted monthly market index returns over one year prior to the 
corresponding firm’s fiscal year. 
 
lagBHR One-year-lagged buy-and-hold market index returns.  
Stdev The standard deviation of CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/Arca 
value-weighted monthly market index returns over one year prior 
to the corresponding firm’s fiscal year. 
 
lagStdev One-year-lagged standard deviation.  
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Appendix 2 Cash holdings by high/low Q and high/low R&D 
 
Variable: Cash Mean Std Obs. Mean Std Obs. t-Test 
Panel A Low Q High Q 
Optimistic group  0.094 0.121 595 0.205 0.175 595 -0.11*** 
Non-optimistic group 0.094 0.132 2,766 0.148 0.158 2,766 -0.05*** 
Panel B Low R&D High R&D 
Optimistic group 0.1 0.115 595 0.198 0.182 595 -0.10*** 
Non-optimistic group 0.092 0.125 2,924 0.154 0.164 2,608 -0.06*** 
This table summarizes a set of descriptive statistics on the variable Cash by partitioning each optimistic and non-
optimistic group’s sample by Q and R&D respectively.  The sample includes CRSP/Compustat firm–year 
observations from 1992 to 2010.  We define CEOs as optimistic (non-optimistic) if they hold exercisable options that 
have more (less) than 100% moneyness. Data for measuring optimism are from the ExecuComp and Compustat 
databases. The variable Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio; Q is the market-to-book ratio; R&D is R&D expenditures 
divided by sales.  All variable definitions are given in the Appendix 1. The last column reports the t-values of the 
tests of differences between the mean cash holdings of the high and low Q groups and also between the high and low 
R&D groups. The superscript *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 3 Regressions of cash holdings on CEO optimism: debt conservatism effect test 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the cash-to-assets ratio.  The independent variables include D (CEO 
optimism dummy), Q (the market-to-book ratio), Size (the logarithm of total assets), Cashflow (cash flow, divided by 
total assets), NWC (working capital from balance sheet minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets), 
Capex (capital expenditures scaled by total assets), Laglev (the one-year lagged value of total long-term debt plus 
debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets), R&D (R&D expenditures divided by sales), Divdu (dividend 
dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays dividends, otherwise zero), Acq (acquisitions divided by total assets), Indusig 
(industry cash flow risk), Own (CEO ownership percentage), Own2 (the square of Own), NI (debt issuance plus 
equity sales minus debt retirement and minus equity repurchases, divided by total assets), the interaction terms 
(defined as D interacted with each independent variable), Kink (debt conservatism). All variable definitions are given 
in the Appendix 1. The standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include cash holdings 
controls, D*cash holdings controls, and year and industry fixed effects.  This table only displays the results for Kink, 
the interaction of this variable with D, and the three-way interaction variables linking Kink, D, and the cash holding 
control variables. The full results are available upon request. 
 
Model 
CEO Optimism cutoff 
1 
100% Cutoff 
2 
67% Cutoff 
Kink 0.034*** 0.037*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
D*Kink 0.017 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
D*Q*Kink 0.012 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
D*Size*Kink -0.001 0.006 
  (0.009) (0.008) 
D*Cashflow*Kink -0.351** 0.038 
  (0.171) (0.191) 
D*NWC*Kink -0.190*** -0.103 
  (0.065) (0.069) 
D*Capex*Kink -0.140 -0.171 
  (0.165) (0.163) 
D*Laglev*Kink -0.129** -0.144** 
  (0.055) (0.060) 
D*R&D*Kink -0.373** -0.254 
 (0.176) (0.173) 
D*Divdu*Kink 0.000 -0.004 
  (0.020) (0.019) 
D*Acq*Kink -0.379*** -0.288** 
  (0.126) (0.117) 
D*Indusig*Kink -0.256 -0.178 
 (0.283) (0.259) 
D*Own*Kink 0.146 0.187 
 (0.510) (0.427) 
D*Own2*Kink -2.087 -0.917 
 (2.706) (2.091) 
D*NI*Kink 0.117 0.167* 
 (0.079) (0.086) 
Optimistic/Total Obs. 870/4,827  1,373/4,827  
Chi-2 3439.1*** 3173.7*** 
